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This article argues that one should consider online and offline radicalization in an
integrated way. Occasionally, the design of some counter-measure initiatives treats the
internet and the “real” world as two separate and independent realms. New information
communication technologies (ICTs) allow extremists to fuse digital and physical settings.
As a result, our research contends that radicalization takes place in onlife spaces: hybrid
environments that incorporate elements from individuals’ online and offline experiences.
This study substantiates this claim, and it examines how algorithms structure information
on social media by tracking users’ online and offline activities. Then, it analyzes how the
Islamic State promoted onlife radicalization. We focus on how the Islamic State used
Telegram, specific media techniques, and videos to connect the Web to the territories
it controlled in Syria. Ultimately, the article contributes to the recalibration of the current
debate on the relationship between online and offline radicalization on a theoretical level
and suggests, on a practical level, potential counter measures.
Keywords: radicalization, algorithms, internet, onlife, media, Islamic State
INTRODUCTION
The police stop a young adult at Bologna’s airport with downloaded Islamic State (ISIS) propaganda
on his phone. Upon the detainee’s release, he reaches out to the Italian branch of the radical
platform al-Mohajiroun, and he is subsequently re-routed to London where the network holds
its headquarters. After prolonged online contact, and a real-world friendship with his future co-
conspirators, he decides to act; he kills 8 people during the so-called London Bridge attack. This
description pictures the radicalization of Youssef Zaghba, a Moroccan-Italian terrorist who died in
2017. To what extent did he develop violent tendencies while socializing in cafés and parks? What
role did digital chatrooms, and their contents, play in funneling his radicalization?
Radicalization is a contested concept with some definitional loopholes. But in this paper, we
will stick to the growing consensus among scholars who consider it as a process of developing
extremist beliefs and ideas while condoning the use of violence as legitimate (McCauley and
Moskalenko, 2008). The exponential growth of new information communication technologies
(ICTs) has prompted experts to consider their impact on terrorist activity. Subsequently, the
internet has become the hallmark of modern radicalization patterns. Whether it is the easiness of
signing up to homogeneous radical communities, unobstructed access to a deluge of violent footage,
or the possibility to reach a global audience, the Web has become a hotbed for terrorist recruitment.
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However, offline bonds and social circles exert a massive, and
sometimes crucial, influence on people’s violent leanings, too
(Weimann, 2015; Winter, 2015).
Research recognizes the importance of questions that enquire
how, and where, radicalization takes place. However, the analysis
of physical and digital relations in radicalization has also
yielded conflicting results and unproductive countermeasures.
Multiple authors have suggested that unsatisfactory results may
be connected to a dearth of empirical data and to the formation
of a “false dichotomy” that views online engagements as separate
from physical relations (Ducol, 2015). This paper will follow
their steps: it will argue that radicalization is better conceived
as a process that unfolds online, and offline, simultaneously in a
hybrid onlife space, to use an expression coined by Floridi (2015).
This onlife space seamlessly integrates elements that pertain to
both the online and offline spheres.
Before moving on, we think it is useful to delineate at
the outset some theoretical and methodological aspects that
define the scope of the present study. On the one hand, the
onlife approach we adopt is to be considered as the latest
stage of a research branch that has and keeps calling for
the integration of digital and real-world features in detailing
out both radicalization patterns and possible countermeasures
(section Online vs. Offline Radicalization: A “False Dichotomy”;
Wojcieszak, 2009, 2010; Scrivens et al., 2019). On the other hand,
we will delve into these problems focusing on a particular kind
of terrorism-related radicalization: ISIS. We consider this case
particularly interesting for the ways in which ISIS has set its
radicalization practices in-between online and offline experience,
thus providing a benchmark for the analysis of the contemporary
strategic attunement between these two dimensions. Moreover,
even though we single out different radicalization contexts in
which an onlife framework may yield fruitful results – and other
authors have recently applied it to examine lone actor cases
(Fisogni, 2019) – the specifics we take into account for ISIS’
onlife radicalization cannot automatically be generalized to other
radicalization forms. In fact, the aim of the present study is mostly
theoretical: we want to outline, through the case studies analysis,
some helpful concepts and attributes to better understand the
onlife character of ISIS’ radicalization strategy. Further research
is needed to see, if and how, our contribution may be extended to
other radicalization contexts.
In methodological terms, we adopt a qualitative approach for
the analysis of our corpus. We will carry out a textual analysis
of a selection of ISIS recruitment videos, looking at the narrative
values they shape and at the mechanisms they use to merge
the reality and the textual level. Following a textual-semiotic
approach, we consider texts (in our case videos) not to be pure
representations of something, but actors intervening in complex
processes that confer sense to the world we live in and to the
actions we perform. This is exactly why it is important to look
at texts: they give us behavior models, shape our beliefs, and
offer an image of us which, very easily, influences our actions.
Any text, according to the semiotic approach (Lorusso, 2015;
Walsh Matthews, 2017), works in this way, but this mechanism
of “return-effect” is even more evident in the onlife dimension
of social media. Similar to the current standard in textual
analysis, our corpus has no statistical relevance. We choose these
texts because they seem particularly “dense” and significant, to
underline some typical discursive mechanisms of the dynamic
online-offline relationship in today’s radicalization. Furthermore,
they can also provide guidelines for the construction of corpuses
in other radicalization contexts. Ultimately, we think that an
onlife conception of radicalization can help counter-terrorism
specialists develop tailored strategies to curb the appeal of
extremist groups and terrorist organizations.
In the following we proceed as follows: in the first section,
we problematize the separation between online and offline
radicalization by first reviewing previous studies that caution
policymakers and experts against the ineffectiveness of such
separation (Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Bliuc et al., 2019); then we
use recent empirical results, which show that the distinction
is a false dichotomy (Neumann, 2013; Gill et al., 2017). In
the second section, we consider how algorithmic data-gathering
activity that manages digital communications on social media
platforms benefits from users’ previous online history and
offline interactions. We examine how algorithms structure
radicalization-oriented echo-systems that merge virtual habits
with offline features. In such onlife environments users complete
their radicalization process surrounded by like-minded associates
and consensual media footage. In the third section we use
the onlife framework to describe ISIS’ radicalization strategies:
ISIS provided its potential recruits with interacting physical
and virtual environments (caliphates) that substantiated its own
us vs. them ideology. Here, “caliphate” refers to the swath
of land that ISIS controls (physical caliphate), and to the
internet spaces that ISIS exploits to broadcast its state-building
project (digital caliphate) (Atwan, 2015). Scholars described the
capability of cross-cutting the events happening in both the
digital and the physical caliphates as one of the distinctive
features at the basis of ISIS’ radicalization success (Winter,
2015, 2018). We argue that the intersection of a physical
entity and a digital cognate stresses the onlife character of
ISIS’ recruitment strategy. This, however, must be considered
as an ISIS-specific maneuver that may have a poor application
range. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, no other terrorist
organization or extremist movement – be it right-wing, left-wing
or religious – has geared its members toward violence using
two co-sustaining spaces in the same way ISIS did. Nevertheless,
sociopsychological studies and recent reports highlight that far-
right movements manipulate the concept of homeland and create
white-only online habitats along ISIS lines (Mols and Jetten,
2014; Conway et al., 2019) but their operations are not the
same as the onlife state-building project of ISIS. The fourth
section considers how services offered by instant-messaging
applications replicate, and reinforce, the affiliative dynamics that
underlie the radicalization of small, isolated cliques. Specifically,
we examine how Telegram’s patrolled chatrooms, and encrypted
secret chats, offer extremists protected locations to foster their
radicalization. The final section uses a representative narrative
corpus – in the sense mentioned above – to analyze how
ISIS has been able to conjugate the onlife environment by
implementing a multitude of reality-like effects that are scattered
throughout its videos.
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ONLINE VS. OFFLINE RADICALIZATION:
A “FALSE DICHOTOMY”
The so-called Web 2.01 and further versions, and new ICTs,
have been game-changers in radicalization’s layout, but their
effects do not restrict to radicalization patterns. It is evident
that these technologies have deeply changed many forms of
our life in general, and of recruitment in particular (from
politics to social works). Similar to most companies, terrorist
organizations took advantage of internet-based affordances, and
they moved a great swath of their operations to the online
world (Amble, 2012; Awan, 2017). Recruitment, propaganda,
network-building, financing, and logistics entered the virtual
arena with such a strength that King and Taylor point out that
terrorism cases without a digital footprint have become rare
(King and Taylor, 2011). As the internet’s mark on radicalization
processes gained traction, scholars started to debate the impact
of digital environments on such processes. Some argued that
consuming jihadi videos on a frequent basis exerts a facilitative
effect by motivating individuals to engage in violent action
(Holt et al., 2015). Others, in contrast, envisaged the internet
merely as an accelerator of radicalization, but did not credit the
platform with an essential role in the process (Van der Valk and
Wagenaar, 2010). More recently and mostly separately, literature
started to discuss radicalized individuals’ relationship with both
cyber interactions and with face-to-face interactions (Archetti,
2015; Klausen, 2015). While there is a growing consensus that
radicalization comprises both kinds of relations, research has
yielded mixed results as to the extent in which online interactions,
and their physical counterparts, are interlocked in the pathways
of radicalized people (Weimann, 2012; Pauwels and Schils, 2016).
Scrivens et al. (2019) list a series of limitations of and provide
suggestions about how the study of the internet’s impact on
violent extremism should progress. Among the issues they call
out, two are of particular interest for our scope: first, a scarcity
of primary data that facilitates a lack of evidence; second, the
necessity of “drawing connections between the on- and offline
worlds of violent extremists” (p. 3) and, thus, of avoiding the
implementation of ineffective countermeasures developed along
a false dichotomy “which artificially distinguishes cyberspace
from the ‘real world”’ (Ducol, 2015, p. 90).
The scarcity of primary data has, of course, to do with high-
risk security issues that would force experts to stay in war zones
and to encounter dangerous individuals (Silke, 2004). As a result,
most studies that concern the extremist use of the internet are
not empirically based; an issue that affects terrorism studies
in general (Sageman, 2014). With a few excellent exceptions
(von Behr et al., 2013; Gill and Corner, 2015; Koehler, 2015;
Gill et al., 2017), the vast majority of research – including
this one – relies on secondary data and anecdotal episodes
that are usually gathered from newspaper articles and other
gray literature (Ducol, 2015). In so doing, the type and quality
of data prevents researchers’ rigorous examinations of the
1The expression Web 2.0 signals a shift in the Web structure toward online
social environments where users can actively participate through the creation and
dissemination of contents on multiple platforms (Beer, 2009).
internet’s influence in radicalization’s promotion. This limitation
is irrespective of whether violent exposure, or the conduits of
cyber-interactions, propel the process. Conway (2017) details
future investigation avenues, and remarks that the study of
internet-based radicalization has been hindered by a dearth of
data-driven descriptive and explanatory research. She suggests
that “basic descriptive research is largely missing from this field,
along with more complex theory-informed approaches” that seek
“to show causal connections” (p. 78).
The other critical issue is the missing acknowledgment of
the reciprocal influence that online associations, and physical
bonds, bear on radicalization. Sometimes, when analyzing the
trajectories of different radicalized offenders “scholars tend to
conceptualize virtual spaces as autonomous from what actually
happens in the “real world” and vice versa” (Ducol, 2015, p. 90;
Gill et al., 2017). As a relic of Web 1.0, where the boundaries
between static websites, and people’s flesh-and-bone interactions
were more clearly defined (Jenkins, 2006), the conception of
the digital and the physical sphere as two fully-encased spaces
gives a misaligned representation of the mechanisms involved in
radicalization. The widespread use of such approaches in counter
radicalization programs is surprising, especially if we consider
that the intimate codependence between digital interactions
and their possible offline spillovers has been well-established
in research branches strictly connected to terrorism studies
like internet and communication studies (Conroy et al., 2012).
For example, Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino examined the responses
of teenagers and university students to the exposure to hate
groups’ propaganda and their attitude toward the latter (Turpin-
Petrosino, 2002). After word-of-mouth and phone contact,
internet was the third most successful technique in provoking
a change of attitude among users. However, 20 years later,
both word-of mouth and phone calls have been incorporated
into the digital world. Crucially, as we will see in section two,
algorithm-based pieces of technology have created a frictionless
relationship between conversations and actions happening in the
real word and those taking place online. The connection between
on- and offline bonds has been more explicitly investigated
in a series of self-report studies by Magdalena Wojcieszak.
The author underlined how both similar and dissimilar offline
social ties exacerbate the ideological extremism of Neo-nazis
and radical environmentalists participating in online forums
(Wojcieszak, 2009, 2010). Many respondents reported that
encountering diverging opinions offline made them delve even
deeper into their extremist ideology with the aim of elaborating
suitable counterarguments. As a result, she advised that engaging
extremists with alternative perspectives might have detrimental
counter-terrorism effects. Not only did her findings extend those
of previous studies about the bearing of both online and offline
interpersonal discussion on political civic engagement (Hardy
and Scheufele, 2005; Shah et al., 2005); they were also confirmed
by recent survey and longitudinal studies focusing, respectively,
on the link between e-participation and a variety of offline
pro-active activities (Tai et al., 2019) and on the repercussion
that local riots have on the Australian white supremacy online
community in terms collective beliefs, emotions and consensus
(Bliuc et al., 2019).
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These insights notwithstanding, we can observe the
magnitude that the on-and-offline false dichotomy has enjoyed
among violent extremism experts. On a theoretical level, the
dichotomous conception has led Sageman (2008a,b) to argue
that “[d]uring the past two or three years, however, face-to-
face radicalization has been replaced by online radicalization.
The same support and validation that young people used to
derive from their offline peer groups are now found in online
forums, which promote the image of the terrorist hero, link
users to the online social movement, give them guidance, and
instruct them in tactics” (p. 41). Likewise, Omotoyinbo (2014)
outlines that “radicalization, in the age of ICT, is basically of
two ramifications i.e., Offline and Online” (p. 54). On a practical
level, the same reasoning has produced some questionable
one-sided countermeasures, such as the FBI Don’t be a Puppet
or the campaign Think Again Turn Away. The former initiative,
in its address of potentially radical individuals, excluded the
impact of offline interactions altogether. The latter campaign
was concerned only with fighting ISIS’s online presence, and it
did not consider its offline side-effects in stigmatizing Muslim
communities in the USA (Davies et al., 2016).
Counter-terrorism experts must consider how social
interactions in today’s world incorporate elements that pertain
to digital artifacts and to people in “real” social settings. In
addition, the border between the Web and the physical world
becomes fuzzier and fuzzier (Burrows, 2009; Dunbar et al.,
2015). As we will explore in the next section, social networking
sites, coupled with mobile devices, enable meanings, beliefs, and
emotions to be concomitantly experienced in the two spheres
to the point that it becomes hard to tell where the individual
ends and the user begins (Floridi, 2015). Take for example the
Christchurch mosque shootings in March 2019. Australian lone
actor Brenton Terrant entered the building and murdered 50
people while recording his brutal attack on a head-mounted
camera and broadcasted it on Facebook. In doing so, not only
did he “air” a terrorist attack online that, unfortunately, inspired
some copycats; his misdeed was the concrete performance
of his pre-attack post that claimed how it was “time to stop
shitposting and time to make a real life effort post” (Conway
et al., 2019, p. 14). As the example shows, in modern extremism,
the internet and physical spaces conflate in unprecedented ways.
However, one should keep in mind that, the onlife degree in
different radicalization cases – the hybridization between online
and offline settings – is to be intended along a continuum.
In some cases, digital and physical interactions interlock in
such a way to maximize the radicalization’s onlife magnitude,
whereas in others, the role of virtual and “real-life” components
is more discernible.
All in all, both theoretical and empirical studies call
for a reconsideration of such a dichotomy. In terrorism
research, Lohlker (2011) investigated the relationship between
the internet and Al Qaeda operatives’ radicalization strategies.
They concluded that the aim of internet jihadis is “to make
the divide between the virtual and the physical more permeable
with the help of elaborate media strategies. The participants
in discussions call more and more for the keyboard to be
exchanged with the detonator” (p. 9–10). And this is precisely
what Humam al Balawi did on December 30, 2009 when he blew
himself up and claimed the life of CIA agents. Informative is
the fact that in his last essay Balawi rhetorically stated: “when
will my words drink from my blood!?” (in Lohlker, 2011, p. 1
3). His dreadful actions confirmed the second hypothesis of the
study according to which “virtual activity creates real terrorist”
(p. 64). Along similar lines, Peter Neumann cautions against
the implementation of one-sided countermeasures like content
removals. Such actions, for example, would be unproductive
in the long run given the vast amount of platforms on which
contents can be disseminated, and, most importantly, they would
deprive intelligence services from gathering useful information
on terrorist behavior. On the other hand, he emphasized the link
between virtual and physical radicalization by predicting that
terrorist organizations will carry out their radicalization project
by conjugating the material portability of smartphones and the
digital character of phone apps (Neumann, 2013; see section
Physical Entitative Groups and Encrypted Online Networks).
More recently, Gill et al. (2017), in their study that analyzes the
use of the internet among 223 UK convicts on terrorism charges,
are very explicit about the risks connected to the applicability of
the above-mentioned dichotomy. They ultimately conclude:
“There is no easy offline versus online violent radicalization
dichotomy to be drawn. It may be a false dichotomy. Plotters
regularly engage in activities in both domains. Often their behaviors
are compartmentalized across these two domains. For example,
plotters may engage in face-to-face interaction regarding the
ideological legitimacy of their actions while engaging in virtual
communication regarding the technical specificity of bomb-making”
(Gill et al., 2017, p. 114).
The operationalization of this divide seems to stand on a
slippery slope even in episodes of lone-actor terrorism. Lone-
actors are defined as isolated individuals who develop an affinity
for radical ideas and violent tendencies in the seclusion of their
accommodations, and who avert any sort of group membership
or external contact. This is why their presence and terrorist
plots are so hard to anticipate and disrupt (Hoffman, 2003;
Spaaij, 2010). A cursory glance at the previous definition and
case studies – like Anders Breviek who murdered 77 civilians in
Norway, 2011 – grants some leeway to the impression that this
perpetrator typology acts solely on its own. However, a deeper
inspection reveals that this is seldom the case. In a recent study,
Lindekilde et al. (2019) contend that, often, these supposedly
under-the-radar actors display their “leakage behavior” through
the establishment, and maintenance, of interpersonal bonds with
leaders, peers and, sometimes, co-conspirators. The magnitude
of these relationships (or alternatively the degree of loneness)
might change on a situational basis: pockets of individuals
may engage only in intermittent peripheral contact, while
others may showcase a higher degree of embeddedness within
extremist circles. Ultimately, the contention that lone-actors
decide to embark on solo terrorist missions should not divert
researchers’ considerations of the impact that outer relations
have on lone-actors’ radicalization processes (Malthaner and
Waldmann, 2014). Importantly, such bonds are both virtual and
physical. Physical and digital connections in lone-actors are so
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intertwined that “online and offline patterns on radicalization
often occur simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing,
and exclusive online radicalization of isolated individuals is
exceedingly rare” (Lindekilde et al., 2019, p. 5). Schuurman
and colleagues based their investigation on similar conclusions,
and they labeled lone-actors as “the typology that should not
have been” (Schuurman et al., 2018, p. 771). Once again,
contrary to popular belief, their article values the impact of
virtual and physical radical milieus on lone-actors’ motivation,
and capacity, to carry out a terrorist attack. These findings
echo Neumann and Steven’s previous research, which, despite
acknowledging the new radicalization potentials that are ascribed
to cyberspace, continue to highlight the unquestionable influence
of real-world ties in self-radicalization instances (Neumann and
Stevens, 2009). Koehler provides further evidence that justifies
the dismissal of this dichotomy. In his interviews, German
Neonazi’s answers suggest how the online, and the offline,
dimensions feedback-loop into one another in terms of ideology
buttressing, propaganda dissemination, and rally participation
(Koehler, 2015).
While further in-depth analysis is needed to understand
the extent of cyber-interactions in the promotion of politically
violent acts, we will introduce a further “algorithmic” add-on
as to why counter-terrorism experts should cautiously avoid
such online/offline divide in the design, and implementation, of
counter-narrative strategies.
ALGORITHMS AND DATAVEILLANCE: AN
ONLIFE MEANING-MAKING
MECHANISM
In this section, we argue that a technological reason as to why
the offline vs. online dichotomy is due for an overhaul dwells
in the systems that regulate online interactions: algorithms.
Radicalization studies have allocated little attention to the
principles that govern algorithmic data-gathering activity in the
structure of radicalization-friendly environments. This sounds
surprising, given that the US National Security Agency claimed to
have nipped more than fifty terrorist attacks in the buds through
the extraction of data from social media (Van Dijck, 2014).
In light of media philosopher Marshall McLuhan’s lesson, who
already over 50 years ago declared that the medium is the message
(McLuhan, 1964), we intend to show how radicalization that
unfolds through social media interactions is partially constituted
by the software and codes that make up the medium (Burrows,
2009). Crucially, algorithms draw intensely on user’s offline
resources in their predictive performance, and they render online
radicalization a more “physical” or “offline” experience than it is
usually thought (Cohen, 2018).
Taken at face value, we tend to picture algorithm-based
systems as autonomous, efficient, platforms that carve the
contours of our virtual scenery (Finn, 2017). They instantly
present us with information that satisfies our search queries,
interests, and desires. In addition, algorithms’ operations under
the surface of users’ online experiences reinforce the “illusion
of platform neutrality” (Gillespie, 2010; Milan, 2015, p. 3): the
information that we receive on our Facebook newsfeed looks as
objective as it can be. But, far from being neutral and objective,
social media algorithms come inscribed with a series of biases that
skew the content selection process; they determine “what there
is to know and how to know it” (Bozdag, 2013; Gillespie, 2014,
p. 167). Put differently, they are information-filtering systems
that are preset with specific ideological proclivities and design
choices, and they prime certain features while neglecting others
(Finn, 2017). For instance, when algorithms scaffold the media
ecology on a user’s laptop, they feed on a vast amount of signals
that encompass previous online history, recently contacted users,
and social gestures, i.e., likes and comments (Bozdag, 2013;
Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013). However, the accumulation of
so-called “dataveillance” is just as important: that is, tracked
information that refers to users’ offline habits. This information
includes location, shopping purchases, and phone calls (Degli
Esposti, 2014; Van Dijck, 2014). A final important, and yet often
undermined, aspect that shapes the algorithmic environment
is the collection of negative media data, i.e., time spent away
from the platform, or typed in – but unposted – comments
(Cohen, 2018).
When all of the abovementioned ingredients are taken into
account, it becomes clear that one can regard algorithm-
run systems as complex, sociotechnical artifacts that interlock
human-machine interactions in a continuous process of content
production. In other words, these calculating vehicles represent
a sophisticated instantiation of the “dynamic cognitive flows
between human, animal, and machine” that constitutes the
cognisphere that we live in Hayles (2006, p. 165). Algorithms
are adaptable systems that co-evolve along with their users.
Their filtering mechanisms aim to structure a mediascape
that is responsive to the updated data-based profile of each
user so as to maximize the time spent surfing the platform
(Cheney-Lippold, 2011). Indeed, one congenital goal of social
networking sites is the creation of engagement. People who
usually succeed in persuading others to prolong, or resume, their
online interactions – by initializing a soon-to-become viral thread
for example – are deemed as soft leaders. However, this mediatic
“participation by default” (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013, p. 14) is
hardly an all-algorithmic business. On the one hand, it is true that
a portion of the user’s digital dossier is built with data “collected
passively without much effort or even awareness on the part of
those being recorded” (Meyer-Schoenberger and Cukier, 2013,
p. 101). On the other hand, the building of someone’s digital
image (datafication) requires a great amount of physical labor.
A user’s geolocation, network nodes’ activity (friends), and user-
curated information influence recommendations. In other words,
the user explicitly provides metadata and tags that allow the
algorithmic mechanism to shape the information it receives. For
example, if I am looking for a restaurant or a car, I am much
more likely to get a diner that is nearby my current position, or
a car that belongs to a close friend of mine – provided that she
posts a car-selling advertisement (Bozdag, 2013). The resultant
outcome of this filtering operation is an immersive environment
that is tailored to meet users’ past, present, and anticipated
tastes. Such computational customization directs users toward
a personalized online experience that is equipped with deeply
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ingrained relational traits. Algorithms cherry-pick contents while
scanning our everyday social spheres in order to present us
with a vast hodgepodge of “entry points” to stay hooked up to
the platform (Willson, 2017). Furthermore, algorithms’ modus
operandi is sustained by the diffusion of portable devices: laptops
and mobile phones provisioned with apps such as Facebook and
Whatsapp. These apps allow algorithms to continuously structure
an up-to-date datafied image of individuals. Data, in fact, might
be partial and incomplete, but they are anything but raw materials
(Gitelman, 2013). As soon as they are collected, data undergo a
refinement progression that is purposed to design a sufficiently
fine-grained user profile. This refinement progression keeps the
latter entangled in the virtual infrastructure.
Social media platforms are dependent on these algorithmic
systems, and they have been said to act as polarizing tools
that promote exposure to pro-attitudinal contents, and easy
contact, with digital like-minded networks (Dylko et al., 2017).
In other words, experts maintain that new media threaten to
create homogenous digital echo chambers. Individuals inhabit
these chambers where only in-group consonant outputs are
circulated at alternative views’ expense (Sunstein, 2017). The level
of algorithmic interference in the creation of echo chambers
has been questioned, however. Large-scale studies measuring the
impact of algorithm-suggested news on selective exposure and
polarization highlight how users’ choices are more influential
than machine-run activities in the creation of echo chambers
(Bakshy et al., 2015; Boxell et al., 2017; Beam et al., 2018).
Even though we agree that environmental bias should not be
overemphasized in the construction of secluded online spaces,
we simultaneously stress how the context in which interactions
occur should not be overlooked2. Here we side up with Steglich
(2019) when he claims that “to blame the negative side effects
of [. . .] echo chambers on individuals’ decisions, and downplay
the role of the algorithms [. . .] is a flawed, incomplete and
dangerous conclusion. These individual decisions take place in
a highly pre-structured environment [which] pre-determines the
[. . .] outcome of the decisions” (p. 22). For instance, simulation
studies analyzing the effects of friendship recommender systems
on social media found that these platforms promote a frequent
network rewiring that may lead to the creation of isolated social
triads (Sasahara et al., 2019). If such triads are inhabited by
radicalizing individuals, then social media algorithms could be
seen as a partial contributor of violent extremism. In other
words, when it comes to radicalization, a selective exposure
apparatus regulates extremism-orientated online echo chambers
that encase “at risk” individuals. These echo chambers are safe
heavens, where violent intents – surrounded by large amounts
of radical narratives – are developed and embraced (Sunstein,
2002; Atwan, 2015; Maggioni and Magri, 2015). It is true that
social media companies have curbed the building and expansion
of extremist echo chambers through frequent account and
content removal (Berger and Morgan, 2015). Nevertheless, the
multiplatform nature of the internet safeguards their survival and
continuation. What is more, counter-terrorism strategists’ efforts
2As a matter of fact we consider radicalization to be the results of recursive
individual-environment interactions.
may fall on deaf ears under the very mechanisms that govern
algorithmic activity. For one thing, if further information on a
user’s screen is based on frequently consumed content, counter-
messages may never enter the mediascape of potential recruits
in the first place. For another thing, even if counter-terrorism
storylines “hit” their target audience, their alleged purpose might
backfire. Individuals, in fact, appropriate meanings in accordance
with the position that they occupy in a specific social network
that is both online and offline, and during their radicalization,
potential recruits usually lurk in hardline networks (Archetti,
2015). For example, the US government campaign Think Again,
Turn Away aired in 2013, which aimed at discouraging ISIS
supporters from migrating to Syria, has proved to be counter-
productive; among other things, it fantasized the Caliphate as a
nightmarish place of destruction. Jihadi supporters were advised
not to buy a “return ticket,” since they would have found
only bombings and death there. In a nutshell, the campaign
championed the high probability of death as a root cause to
stay home. But inadvertently, uncompromising Salafist youths
considered the very same death dimension on online social
settings as the only way to reach the bliss of martyrdom (Katz,
2014; Van Eerten et al., 2017).
While we subscribe to the influence of online echo chambers
on radicalization, we propose that online echo chambers are
better considered as echo-systems that incorporate digital, and
real-world, elements alike in light of the algorithms’ filtering
mechanism. Importantly, contents and interactions conducive to
radicalization intersect artifacts, environments, and bodies in a
dynamic fashion as the algorithms and the individuals seamlessly
feedback loop information into each other. An ISIS French
video, which involves stabbings and decapitations, in a user’s
recommendation list might be the combined outcome of her
online consummation of similar footage in the past, her offline
life in France, and her purchase of a knife a couple of days before.
Admittedly, the algorithm has access to the knife purchase’s
information if it is made with a credit card that is connected to
an online bank account. In doing so, the algorithms may register
such a purchase, and it may match it with knife-related tags in
the video. Moreover, mobile devices can allow me to watch, and
comment, on such videos, while I am simultaneously engaged in
a physical meeting with other peers.
Here and in the following, we follow the lines of Luciano
Floridi and colleagues when we argue that (radicalized)
individuals should be better regarded as individuals who populate
an onlife infosphere: a new dimension that characterizes human
beings in the contemporary algorithm-based era (Floridi, 2015).
Floridi contends that, in this third space, “the digital is spilling
over into the analog and merging with it” in unprecedented,
and sometimes unforeseeable, ways (Floridi, 2007, p. 62), and
suggests that “the threshold between here (analog, carbon based,
off-line) and there (digital, silicon-based, online) is fast becoming
blurred” (ibid. p. 63; italics in the original). Onlife interactions are
creating connected information organisms (inforgs), and they are
resorting to digital and physical artifacts to go by with their lives.
In our view, algorithms and portable devices are just the latest
manifestation of the continuous interactive dynamics between
online, and offline, dimensions. Another advantageous feature
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of the onlife dimension that could explain why terrorist groups
have been so fond of the Web 2.0 is the “shift from the primacy
of entities to the primacy of interaction” (Floridi, 2015, p. 63).
In other words, people in this hyperconnected era establish their
identities and beliefs by leveraging on multiple relationships that
fluctuate primarily from onlife intimate groups (family, peers)
and, subsequently, expand into the larger society (Floridi, 2015,
p. 98). This conception fits well in the relational approaches to
radicalization, whereby the process takes place “in a dynamic
constellation of multiple spaces and social relationships over
time” (Lindekilde et al., 2019, p. 5). Algorithms make the digital
and physical settings all the more intertwined. In the next section,
we will analyze how ISIS managed to intertwine the online, and
offline, sphere in its recruitment process.
THE ONLIFE ISIS RECRUITMENT: US VS.
THEM
The Islamic State has been proclaimed defunct. After a concerted
military effort that lasted about 4 years, a coalition of more than
sixty countries managed to quarantine this once proto-state to
a handful of in-land outposts. However, what now resembles
an insurgent group has been the latest uncontested protagonist
of the jihadi galaxy. Over the past 5 years, an unprecedented
wave of foreign fighters replenished its militia manpower, thus
securing the possibility to first conquer, and later administer,
a territory as big as the United Kingdom. Figures suggest that
30,000 conscripts voluntarily flocked to ISIS-controlled Syria
to partake in its utopian governance project; 5,000 conscripts
were of Western descent (Schmid and Tinnes, 2015). So-called
returnees’ recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, with a
combined death toll of 132 civilians, showcase these conscripts’
continued security threat. As a result, governments invested
massive funds to stop this extremist human hemorrhage, and
academic circles started to peruse the root causes of ISIS’s appeal
(Milton, 2016). A dissection of Islamic State’s paraphernalia of
narratives, which it weaves to lure young recruits to the so-
called Caliphate, shows a distinctive feature that stitches such
propaganda together. This feature concerns the presence of an
overarching enemy that assails the Islamic identity (Schmid,
2015; Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2016). This ideological position
is nothing new: literature that concerns social movements and
intractable conflicts is replete with examples of radical groups
that feel engaged in a Manichean struggle against an evil enemy,
and the Islamic State is no exception (McCauley and Moskalenko,
2011; Della Porta, 2013; Halperin, 2016). From a theoretical
standpoint, ISIS inherited al Qaeda’s well-established ideological
template and it brushed this template with convenient theological
interpretations (Schmid, 2014). Indeed, Mark Sedgwick points
out that the modern “jihadist account of the existing order”
posits “a fundamental division between Muslims and non-
Muslims, and that Muslims are suffering because of non-
Muslims” (Sedgwick, 2012, p. 368). The paramount narrative of
ummah, the imagined global community of Muslims that should
be re-united under an Islamic banner away from illegitimate
powers, compounds this inter-religious division (Cook, 2005;
Campanini, 2008). To be a viable, and practical, concept in
jihadist circles, the ummah presupposes the complementary
existence of a non-Muslim adversarial conglomerate that has split
Islamic devotees apart since time immemorial (Günther, 2014).
Consequently, the Islamic State portrays itself as the bastion
of the ultimate faithful that confronts the aggressive attacks
of “infidels”. Its manifesto encourages infidels’ annihilation to
secure the unadulterated continuation of the whole Muslim
community. This ideological operation amounts to a black-
and-white worldview granted with an us vs. them perspective
where the presence of the enemy embodies an existential threat
(McCants, 2015; Stern and Berger, 2015).
Burgeoning evidence suggests that adherence to such a
binary and emotionally charged worldview is one of the main
levels that pushes enlisters to increase the ranks of radical
violent organizations (Horgan, 2014; Bronner, 2016). Relatedly,
the Muslim/non-Muslim divide molds a cognitively inflexible
plateau of unequivocal boundaries that is prone to stir potential
recruits toward radicalization (Hogg et al., 2013). ISIS enforces
this simplistic separation, and it eviscerates the potentially
inconsistent motivational salience that comes from all the other
socially relevant categories – gender, age, nationality, educational
level, and occupation – in the name of a dogmatic, and easily
applicable, religious congruity. However, if an intransigent us vs.
them ideology is all it takes to persuade thousands of violent
Salafists toward radicalization, this would not explain how, and
why, al Qaeda – the jihadist organization par excellence – failed to
mobilize such a critical mass. What really sets ISIS apart from its
competitors is the Caliphate’s unexpected announcement; a step
that Bin Laden and his associates never ventured to take.
The revival of this highly revered religious-political entity as
the righteous land for the Muslims allowed the 2014-branded
Islamic State to experience an exception inflation of recruits.
But why is that so? Surely, the Caliphate – in the pious Muslim
mindset – is connected to a regime of sacred values and temporal
apocalypticism that social psychologists and sociologists might
engender as the acceptance of violence as a political opinion
amongst hard-liners (Atran et al., 2014; Berger, 2015; Roy, 2017;
Winter, 2018). Core to the present study, the proclamation of the
Caliphate substantiated the us vs. them ideology with a spatial
dimension that blended virtual and physical interactions. For
example, in ISIS’ online-magazine Dabiq (2014), al-Baghdadi
proclaimed a physical proto-state whose vicissitudes and shape
were tightly coupled with its digital counterpart. He thereby
fueled an onlife radicalization process. ISIS, in fact, was quick
to set foot in the digital arena: they carved out cross-platform
spaces where its potential recruits could partake in its own
constitution by joining the cyber-army of sympathizers and
proselytizers who shared and celebrated ISIS’s war victories. This
is not to say that there is no distinction between online and
offline. It suffices to say that the physical Caliphate’s borders
are now non-existent, and the living conditions in war-flagged
Syria have no resemblance with the image that is fabricated
by ISIS propagandists. Nonetheless, as far as recruitment goes,
the making of the actual Islamic State, as the in-group physical
institution, is feedback-looped into a virtual duplicate that is
populated by jihadi comrades. Indeed, Islamic State is also a
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multi-platform digital Caliphate where radicalization could begin
and continue; it seems driven by the mutual interdependence of
these two spaces (Price et al., 2014; Atwan, 2015).
Put differently, on the internet, “at risk” individuals, fostered
by algorithmic mechanisms, could safely inhabit growing
radicalization echo chambers that were directly connected to on-
the-ground developments. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say
that ISIS onlife state-building project enjoyed disproportionate
media coverage up to the point that some experts claimed it
to be “the sole source of its appeal” (Winter, 2018, p.106).
For example, studies suggest that the direct online engagements
between foot soldiers that broadcasted battle segments on social
media, and male users who watched and messaged them, was a
paramount component in the radicalization process’s escalation
(Winter, 2015). Winter considers this point, and he argues how
these enlisters represent the living embodiment of the actual
jihadist who tips potential recruits over the edge by bridging the
distance between the bedroom and the battlefield in a manner
that propaganda alone simply cannot. The Twitter campaign
mounted by ISIS around the death of Muath al-Kaseasbeth
is another instance of how meanings, maneuvers, and beliefs
crossed physical and digital settings. Before the Jordanian Pilot’s
execution, the Islamic State launched an online survey that asked
its cyber militants for the most suitable capital punishment
(Griffin, 2014). The hashtag #weallwanttoslaughtermoaz went
viral in jihadist online circles, and it made online members’
abilities to “have a say” in the execution process possible.
Likewise, women were attracted to migrate to the Caliphate by
the perspective of becoming the founding mothers and wives
of a Sharia-ruled land. Inspired by communication with and
pictures of women employed as nurses, teachers or police forces,
hundreds of Western Muslim women flocked to Syria to live out
“their religion in a congenial environment” (Peresin, 2015, p. 24).
A prominent ISIS female recruiter known as Umm Ubaydah
wrote that for her, as well as for others, a core reason to move to
Syria was the willingness “to build an Islamic State that lives and
abides by the law of Allah” (Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 12). The former
description highlights the onlife character of ISIS’ radicalization
strategy. In other words, radicalized individuals could swarm
an expanding digital Caliphate: an extended online environment
that provided a space for individuals to do battle with the enemy,
and it also presented individuals with a foretaste of expectations
in Syria by partaking in the construction, and dissemination, of
physical developments (Fisher, 2015). It is no coincidence, in
fact, that ISIS’s territorial extension, and the number of foreign
fighters, goes hand-in-hand with its digital media capability and
presence (Berger and Morgan, 2015; Nanninga, 2019).
At the end of this section, we will sketch some suggestions
that future research may take as prompts to extend the onlife
framework that we have outlined to the analysis of far-right
movements. However, before doing so, we put forward some
elements that make ISIS’ onlife strategy ISIS-only and, thus,
limit the scope of our analysis. First, we have to consider the
very state-building project: ISIS managed to militarily seize and
control a physical territory and ruled over it with a religious
iron fist. The broadcasting of the chance to join armed battles
and to implement laws and regulations is something that no
other extremist organization – whether right-wing, left-wing or
jihadi – can grant their members with. A clue that supports
the importance of this aspect is the incredible amount of “air
time” that ISIS propagandists devoted to war and victory media
outputs, during its peak (Winter, 2015). Second, in spite of the
contested role that the institution of the Caliphate played in the
course of Islamic history, the latter is still revered by Muslims
from across the West and the Middle East alike. For instance, the
popularity for the resurgence of the Caliphate is made clear by a
2007 poll result from four major Muslim countries that revealed
that sixty-five percent of respondents wished to live under a
single Sharia-based country (Pankhurst, 2013). Beside the survey,
Islamic historian Wael Hallaq penned down a detailed analysis
about the differences between the modern European state and
the conception of state based on Islamic sources and declared the
impossibility of reconciling the two (Hallaq, 2013). His analysis
provides keen insights for the examination of why the Caliphate
might be highly praised by a segment of Islamic population. ISIS,
on its part, seems to have taken these considerations into account
and riddled its messages with powerful Caliphate-related and
religious narratives that have remained surprisingly stable along
the years (Kuznar, 2017).
Over the last few years, the far-right scene has developed
an onlife radicalization project that, in some respects, resembles
the tactics employed by ISIS. We notice how these movements
follow the lines of violent Islamism and use specific media
strategies to transfer the battleground in front of the users. Just
like ISIS invited potential recruits to share battles online to later
join ISIS physically, right-wing inspired lone actors stream their
terrorist acts to let similarly minded individuals participate and
copy what they do (the Halle synagogue shooting was inspired
by the Christchurch massacre and both were available online).
Furthermore, sociological and socio-psychological research has
proved how extreme right-wing movements and leaders mobilize
their members by evoking the narrative of an ethnically
homogeneous homeland that is easily replicable online (Mols
and Jetten, 2014). A growing amount of evidence, in fact,
underlines how right-wing groups use internet platforms to
churn out white supremacy-only spaces (Conway et al., 2019).
At first glance, these onlife maneuvers around the notion of
homeland come close to the ways in which ISIS uses the concept
of Caliphate in its radicalization project. However, a blunt
comparison between the two would amount to an inappropriate
interpretative stretching. In fact, right-wing groups neither have
a swath of land where to implement their worldview, nor is the
concept of homeland deeply-ingrained in mainstream European
society. Notwithstanding these differences, we envisage multiple
avenues for the comparison of ISIS and far-right groups onlife
strategies (Al-Rawi, 2018; Schwarzenegger and Wagner, 2018).
One is the topic of the next section: how encrypted messaging
services facilitate the onlife radicalization of small cliques.
PHYSICAL ENTITATIVE GROUPS AND
ENCRYPTED ONLINE NETWORKS
We borrow Donatella della Porta’s words when we say
that ideological encapsulation and militant enclosure
are two recurring features of the radicalization process
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(Della Porta, 2013). Ideological encapsulation is the radical
individuals’ acceptance of blunt us vs. them reasoning. Moreover,
militant enclosure signals how such individuals often mature
violent leanings while they socialize in small affiliative cliques. In
short, it is no exaggeration to say that radicalization is about who
you know (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Malthaner’s recent study
analyzes the formation of the so-called Sauerland-Group, a terror
cell plotting attacks in Germany. In this study, he concludes
that “the group emerged from a radical network that formed
within the wider Salafist movement and to which it remained
connected during preparations for violent attacks” (Malthaner,
2014, p. 648). However, while scholars have recognized the
significance of broader social networks as a receptacle of new
recruits, they have also noticed that those among extremist
circles progressively sever their ties with their surroundings,
and they continue the radicalization in a more isolated and
intimate location. This process is usually referred to as “going
underground” (Della Porta, 2013; Malthaner and Waldmann,
2014; Decety et al., 2018). Social psychologist Michael Hogg
suggests that the physical segregation of micro-cliques tends to
produce entitative groups: closed units of individuals that are
endowed with clear boundaries, internal homogeneity, and a
well-defined inner structure where black-and-white ideologies,
and the adoption of aggressive actions, are allowed to breed on a
fertile ground (Hogg, 2012).
In fact, these insular entities of like-minded people not
only provide terrorist cells with a hiding place away from the
surveillance of intelligence services; they are also likely to take
the radicalization process to an extreme extent through the
conjoined conduits of specific cognitive, and affective, dynamics.
Research has shown that exclusive social interaction in such self-
confined spaces may augment the divide between in-group and
out-group members up to the point that the latter get completely
deprived of their humanity. These out-group members may
become the worth target of harmful actions (Waytz and Epley,
2012; Kteily et al., 2016). In the case of ISIS, this dehumanization
operation may possess even greater magnitude in consideration
of the explicit raw treatment that they give to their victims
in countless gruesome videos. In addition, entitative groups
display an equivalent predilection toward in-group members.
The restricted socializing setting ensures a perceived similarity
among different individuals that culminates in the reciprocal
development of strong affective attachments and congruent
cognitive interpretations.
Recent technological advancements have found a way to
substantiate similar digital dynamics, and they have opened up
new avenues for private, and public, isolated communication.
The use of encrypted messaging services, like Whatsapp and
Telegram, allows individuals to easily exchange private texts, and
other media products, in safe environments. These platforms
can engage peer-to-peer, and closed group, communication
without any content being leaked to undesired users or third
parties. Ultimately, it appears that small cliques have settled
down in a fructuous digital location to perpetuate their physical
activity. Encrypted messaging services enable terrorist groups
to ‘transplant’ their entitative organizational chart onto digital
platforms. Moreover, even if we present them separately for
clarity’s sake, one must remember that they act in joint
unison with their physical counterpart: they trigger an onlife
radicalization process.
While radical groups’ activities on mainstream social media
can be considered as providing broad radical milieus that
aid novices’ initiation to violent Salafism, encrypted messaging
services represent closed-circuit niches where hardliners can
coordinate radicalizing operations in complete detachment from
outgroup members (Shehabat and Mitew, 2018). As we will
see, encryption contrasts with more popular platforms: it
grants chatting apps with an “underground character,” and it
makes them particularly resilient to infiltration attempts (Bloom
et al., 2017). Our analysis focuses on the app Telegram, since
research has pointed to this service as the fulcrum where
ISIS cyberactivists mainly rearrange their maneuvers (Yayla and
Speckhard, 2017). Telegram is a free multi-platform app that
guarantees secure text exchange. It was launched in August 2013
by Nikolai and Pavel Durov, the creators of VKontakte – often
known as the Russian Facebook. Telegram relies on channels
and chatrooms. Channels are unidirectional structures where
content is posted by centralized operators, and users cannot
actively comment on them. Conversely, chatrooms are more
dynamical and action-oriented. They enable (groups of) users to
disseminate videos, radio broadcasts, memes, and other products
(Shehabat et al., 2017). Importantly, they also signal the first
step toward enclosed groups of like-minded individuals. Unlike
major social networks, individuals’ entrances to such chatrooms
require specific invitations. In this instance, these invitations are
often links that are distributed directly by ISIS administrators.
Moreover, most links are time-limited; they become inactive
after a predetermined period (Bloom et al., 2017). This filtering
mechanism allows ISIS Telegram officials to have a high selection
control over the populace of such chatrooms so as to form radical
conclaves. Another feature that augments the homogeneous
degree of these environments concerns the relative facility to
detect assorted sorts of interlopers – be it academics, journalists,
or surveillance agents. Indeed, chatrooms’ registration of lists of
active members, and the time of the latest posted content, allows
ISIS supporters to ban so-called lurkers (inactive participants).
This is exactly what happened to the authors of a 2017 study
who were blocked on multiple chatrooms after extended periods
of inaction (Bloom et al., 2017). These algorithmically regulated
chatrooms ensure the “online killing” of the enemy, and they
provide members with a clear-cut in-group space in turn. Put
differently, an action-oriented involvement on the user part, who
must show her loyalty to the Islamic State through a constant
interaction lest cybersoldiers expel her from the group, promotes
radicalization in such digital locations.
However, Telegram’s well-advertised algorithmic end-to-end
encryption underlies the “underground” genesis of radical
small cliques. Telegram applies this secrecy trait to one-to-
one interactions, but research suggests that new protocols
might extend this feature to the whole triad of new media
communication. End-to-end encryption means that, during peer-
to-peer communication, all data is exchanged only between
the sender and the receiver (Shehabat et al., 2017). There is
already some proof that shows perpetrators’ capacities to engage
other trusted individuals in secluded and secret chatrooms
(Meichtry and Schechner, 2016). In addition, all the messages can
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be automatically erased using a “self-destruct option” as soon as
they reach their intended audience. Such a function places an
investigative burden on intelligence agencies’ detection activities
(Bloom et al., 2017). Accordingly, Telegram allows extremists
to arrange themselves in entitative virtual cliques that mirror
the structure of their physical counterparts. Enemies are kept
at a distance and, if tracked, they get ousted promptly. On
the other hand, secluded digital proximity promotes affiliative
ties among ISIS sympathizers. Crucial, though, is the cloud-
based nature of Telegram, which buttresses the onlife trend of
the radicalization process. Versatile multi-platform entry points,
admittedly, engender the possibility for radicalized individuals to
cut symbiotically across physical and digital borders.
RECRUITING THROUGH VIDEOS:
IMMERSIVE AND REALITY-LIKE EFFECT
IN ISIS PROPAGANDA
We have just seen the effectiveness of Telegram: it cuts across
the dynamic boundary between online and offline radicalization
experiences. However, in the Web 2.0 culture, even more
traditional media solutions – like short amateur videos – have
become a powerful tool of onlife experience. In particular, in ISIS’
recruitment activity, online videos are not a secondary tool; they
are one of the trademarks that foster the radicalization of foreign
fighters on a worldwide scale (Sardarnia and Safizadeh, 2017).
Therefore, we will examine the textual and technical strategies
that are employed in some of these media outputs. Specifically,
we focus on the narrative and figurative features of the “actors”,
on the camera use, and on the setting type3.
Our corpus comprises of six videos that were produced by
al-Hayat Media Centre between 2014 and 2018. Three videos
belong to the “Inside the Caliphate” format; they show foreign
fighters’ description of their first-hand experience as soldiers
of the Islamic State. The remaining videos are nasheeds; these
files visually explain the urgency to join jihad, the life in Syria,
and the treatment of the enemy. Different factors dictated our
choice. First, the corpus offers a thorough picture of different
onlife components that drive the radicalization process. Second,
al-Hayat is the official media wing of the Islamic State, and it is
involved in the production of contents that are aimed at Western
audiences and recruits (our primary source of interest) (Milton,
2018). Furthermore, our analysis of videos released only by al-
Hayat made sure that the footage was officially ISIS-branded,
and that such footage was consistent in its technical features. We
3Our textual-semiotic approach is based on Greimas (1970). The basic idea of
the semiotic approach is that the internal narrative organization of each text (be
it verbal or visual), creates meaning effects and these meaning effects shape our
minds, our behavior, our emotions, so that they strongly condition our experience
in the world. The narrative level of texts does not merely consist of the explicit
elements making up the narration, but it also include the implicit developments,
the implicit values, and the implicit connotations associated to some given features
(i.e., if a text recurs to the image of a battle, this implies a narrative pattern made
of enemies, weapons, strategy, decisional hierarchy, and so on). An in-depth look
at the narrative level enables the analyst to grasp some implicit semantic elements
which condition the viewer’s behavior without being explicit said. This narrative
approach is crucial for the whole semiotic approach to cultural dynamics (as in
Lorusso, 2015).
provide the complete list of videos at the end of this paper. We
accessed all the videos on https://jihadology.net/.
As we have already said in the introduction, we are well
aware of our non-statistical approach and the quantitative limits
of the corpus used. Nevertheless, we think the corpus fits a
textual analysis concerned with pinpointing the onlife character
inscribed in ISIS’ radicalization. In fact, in textual qualitative
analysis what matters is the significance of the corpus not its
representativeness on a statistical base. Just as in ethnographic
analysis, the analyst aims to highlight a general anthropological
problem through the focus on a very specific case.
To begin with, our analysis considers the us vs. them
opposition – mentioned in section three – as a structural feature
that establishes a recurrent pattern throughout the corpus. On
the one hand, the us of the Islamic world is always depicted as
plural and manifold: it portrays a world that is inhabited by many
people, recognizable faces, and multiple thematic roles. These
roles include soldiers, religious leaders, and fathers. Additionally,
all of these characters build on an atmosphere of togetherness
that is reminiscent of the ummah that ISIS tries to create. Physical
proximity (people hugging) and coordinated movements (groups
in circles around a flag) constitute this community sense. Above
all, though, foreign fighters’ testimonies, coupled with a massive
use of close-ups, establishes the Islamic world’s personalization: in
short, ISIS’s world is a human world. On the other hand, the them
of the Western world is undifferentiated and depersonalized.
Accordingly, enemies, such as the USA and the Soviet Union, are
lumped together. Christians and Jews become interchangeable
entities. Moreover, a simplistic narrative frame reduces the
Western world either to its deceiving leaders or to graphs. In
other words, it is as if, in the sphere of them, there is no
“real” life and humanity. Rather, there are only powerful lying
leaders. This true-false rhetoric crosses the entire corpus. Islam
is not only a true doctrine; it is also an authentic world that
is made up of active ordinary people that continuously unfold
on the screen. Conversely, the West is false and corrupt –
both in its values, and in its idols/leaders. In these videos, ISIS
generates an Islamic humanization through their differentiation
in subjectivities’ constructions. Indeed, even before the ascription
of explicit and positive values to Muslims themselves, life and
humanness are inherently present within them. For one thing,
these videos manipulate their addressees, and they call them
to action in an explicit way. Additionally, they offer such
a delegitimized and depreciated representation of the enemy
to make “natural,” and spontaneous, any type of aggressive
reaction against it.
The interrelation between realism, and the immersive
strategy4 that feeds – in a certain way –radicalization’s onlife
dimension is an even more interesting factor in this corpus. As
we have already said, the onlife realm characterizes the lives of
4We use immersive strategy in the way it is intended in contemporary media
studies (Lister et al., 2009; Rose, 2012). Rather than contents or stories, media
today aim to produce experiences that entail the sensory stimulation of the
viewer. Such sensory stimulation comprises the viewer’s projection, emotional
involvement and identification. A paradigmatic example of this strategy are video
games and all forms of augmented reality. A last element at the basis of immersive
communication is what Jenkins (2006) calls media convergence, i.e., the interaction
between different media that produces integrated consumption flows.
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us all, but it is particularly salient in the media productions
that ISIS broadcasts online. ISIS’ videos always adopt a realistic
style where the viewer is not presented with a distant Islamic
world. Contrarily, the viewer gets immersed in what we call a
reality bath. This reality bath seems to take on two different
declinations in the corpus: a testimonial declination (1) and a
video-ludic declination (2) that, however, is never “unrealistic.”
The testimonial declination emerges in the videos that have a
strong protagonist: a militant who explains the reasons, and
the meaning, of the battle to be undertaken. The militant often
shows, and quotes, the Koran. More generally, he cites the values
of jihad and the importance of setting an example to others.
Moreover, in order to strengthen the credibility of his battle
experience, the militant’s body sometimes shows the uncensored
effects of the war. For example, in “Islamic State: Inside the
Caliphate 6,” the solider is seriously injured or irreparably
crippled. Yet, his disabled condition – which exonerates him
from further combat – testifies his greatness and resilience, while
it implicitly invites all of those who enjoy a better physical
shape to take action. Indeed, such individuals have no excuse to
stay inoperative. Likewise, these videos’ concreteness is another
crucial aspect of such testimonies. Importantly, they are not
abstract lessons in jihadist Islamic doctrine, and they are not
fatwa interpretations. Rather, they are credible testimonies that
are authenticated by flesh-and-bone individuals with first and
last names. Relatedly, the protagonists of videos like “Islamic
State: Inside the Caliphate 2,” and “Islamic State: Inside the
Caliphate 6,” are Abu Adam – from Australia – and Abu Salih
from America. These two very recognizable figures introduce
their war experience by directly addressing the viewer, and they
also invite the viewer to take action against the enemy. This call
to arms addresses those who are either at home or in Syria. Such
an invitation is very detailed, and it often comprises a list of
weapons, or strategies, to carry out a successful terrorist attack. In
so doing, the two fighters establish a very intimate relation with
the viewer who eventually may “exit” the online video and contact
them, or who may attempt to take action herself. In other words,
Abu Adam and Abu Salih represent the enlisters who bridge the
gap between the battlefield and the bedroom with their online
solicitation, and they possibly produce offline effects in a typical
onlife circuit (Winter, 2015)5.
Another noteworthy feature is how the realistic scenario, in
which these witnesses are immersed, is presented as their “natural
environment.” Most of the time, the action takes place in a Middle
Eastern post-war landscape. This landscape is marked by desert
ground and semi-destroyed buildings. Accordingly, the camera
captures the scenery where the battle took place and where the
potential recruits may find themselves fighting. Interestingly, the
presence of a glorious mujahidin in a desolated landscape made
of ruins establishes a sort of pattern throughout various videos.
Indeed, the mujahadin’s stature suggests that jihad – irrespective
of where it takes place – entails these places. This is the case
in “Islamic State: Inside the Caliphate 6” and “Islamic State:
Inside the Caliphate 2.” In both examples, battleground realness’s
emphasis marks an abrupt change from abstract room walls,
5We cannot neglect the potential simulacrality of these enlisters. In fact, the whole
recording could be fake or carefully performed – a sort of make-believe.
or caves, that other terrorist groups prefer to use as venues
for video recordings. While a realistic environment erases the
specificity of the venue, it also associates militancy with a concrete
scenario. In a certain sense, it accustoms the target audience
to a future landscape of destruction. In this way, the viewer
becomes the recipient of a double-realistic manipulation6: a direct
testimony that bears all the brutality of war on the fighters’
bodies signals these recordings’ authenticity, and a recurrent
situation – detached from all abstract teachings – facilitates these
videos’ concreteness.
Instead, the declination – which we call video-ludic – gives
up the testimony’s force to strengthen the simulacrum of a close
experience of war. It exposes the violent actions, the victims,
the blood, and the bodies without hesitation in an extremely
“raw” way that does not place any constraint on the contents’
ethical visibility. In videos such as “Answer the Call” or “Oh
Disbelievers of the World,” ISIS media operators construct this
uncensored visibility by using close shots and very fast editing.
This option provokes an action-oriented effect of accumulation
where concrete battle snippets are amassed together without
a precise order. Dozens of decapitations, and blood-soaked
knives, give the viewer an uncut image of what ISIS jihad is all
about. The videos’ editing speed is reminiscent of the fictional
video-ludic dimension that is typical of first-person shooters
and Hollywood blockbusters. They also possess an underlying
emotional pattern that involves the Western spectator through
disgust and excitement. However, the same fast-paced editing
allows one to expand the real, and it allows one to multiply it in
its various facets. In so doing, this technique submits the viewer
in a few minutes (3 or 4 on average) to a rich range of “concrete
cases” that, again, create the immersion effect. To put it bluntly,
the multiple close-ups of throat-cutting and dismembered bodies
evoke a near-pornographic characterization, which inscribes the
plain emotional aspect in reality’s crudeness.
In these videos, a combination of narrative strategies, such
as the camera closeness and the footage speed, act out the
aforementioned “bath of reality.” These strategies do not allow
the eye to linger on any detail; instead, they overwhelm the viewer
with all the weight, and the violence, of plain reality. Unlike
Hollywood films, these videos portray the death of real human
beings – even if the fast editing somehow mitigates this effect.
In these videos, ISIS media productions do not leave anything
undefined. Potential recruits are seduced with the proof of a
concrete experience – whether painful or violent – that is testified
by injured, but resilient, mujahidin of which the recruit aims to
become a mirror image. Relatedly, the word “example” recurs
several times in these videos. On-the-ground jihadists are, and
must set, an example for both close radicalizing peers, and they
are also examples for distant vulnerable enemies.
Media productions’ depictions of normality is another
interesting, and perhaps counterintuitive, feature that ISIS uses
to draw its online recruits to Syria. In videos such as “Islamic
State: Inside the Caliphate 5” or “Our State is Victorious,” we
6According to Greimas (1970), every text or media product entails, first and
foremost, a manipulation of the addressee to make her believe what the text
supports. Along these lines, manipulation is not a negative discursive aspect; it
is rather, a necessary narrative phase that shows how there cannot be neutral or
unbiased texts.
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find no “exceptional man,” no abstract model, and no special
life. Gestures and moments are common and everyday. For
example, daily scenes where children run through the streets,
and where ordinary men talk and clean their weapons, are shot
with fixed – or disorderly moving – cameras, create an effect
of amateurism that aims to convey spontaneity, authenticity,
and sincere initiative impulse. Ultimately, potential online
members see neither an abstract recruitment protocol nor a
spectacle of exceptions. Rather, they take a reality bath in their
future offline world.
CONCLUSION
Radicalization is a complex phenomenon. New technologies,
and especially the internet, affect the violent trajectories
of different terrorist offenders more and more frequently.
However, building on previous research, our study suggests
that, when one considers internet-based radicalization, the
sphere of digital engagements should not be treated as separate
from physical interactions. Rather, radicalization processes
evolve, and develop, by integrating elements that pertain
to both. This happens, for example, in the construction of
online social environments. Here, the interaction between
users and algorithm-based platforms structures radicalization-
oriented echo chambers by incorporating users’ online, and
offline, information simultaneously. Consequently, we argue that
radicalization should be seen to take place in onlife echo systems:
hybrid locations where users’ online interactions are partially
determined by their everyday physical behavior and vice versa.
Dataveillance and portable devices, in fact, establish a 24/7 cycle
where radicalization can dynamically unfold on Facebook pages
and in private houses. The awareness of online communication’s
integration with offline experience has led ISIS to exploit the
radicalization potential of the onlife dimension. Such exploitation
has occurred on mainstream social media and on Telegram. In
these hybrid echo-systems, potential recruits can radicalize with
the help of like-minded peers and consensual media products.
Relatedly, ISIS has been very keen to design compelling videos:
these videos connect the viewer directly to on-the-ground foreign
fighters. The latter provide a concrete testimony of jihadi life; they
close the gap between the bedroom and the battlefield, and they
can tip recruits over the edge in turn. Here we should not think
of any media-reality determinism. Instead, we should consider
how the projective media potential of these heroic figures, which
explicitly invite one to follow their lead, fosters radicalization.
To highlight this pressing aspect, we have adopted a textual
approach that investigated how ISIS has leveraged on the soldier-
viewer onlife relationship to build a communicative dimension
where manipulation and identification are the cornerstones that
push potential recruits toward violence. With regard to this
point, we think that the combination of existing and new
narrative approaches represents a fruitful way to better design
counter-radicalization programs by exposing ever-evolving onlife
features of violent extremism.
The present study represents a first step toward a reframing
of radicalization as a complex onlife process that surely
needs further elaboration. Indeed, our ISIS-centered analysis
presents some peculiarities that may limit its extension to
other radicalization contexts. On the one hand, ISIS has
been the only terrorist actor, so far, that has coupled the
efficacy of its online presence with the administration of
a physical Caliphate. The possibility of branding its onlife
character around the broadcast of exciting war footage
and day-to-day governance might lie at the basis of ISIS’
success and is out of reach for other extremist organizations
with different political or religious agendas. On the other
hand, our case studies and text-based methodology have no
statistical relevance and do not offer explicit guidelines for a
systematic implementation in current counter-radicalization
programs. This is why we encourage follow-up content
analysis and longitudinal studies on extremists’ online and
offline behavior to complement this rather new approach.
Furthermore, we advocate an interdisciplinary effort aimed
at distinguishing between the various algorithm types that
regulate users’ activities on different platforms; this is an
essential step if any counter-radicalization intervention
is to be successful. Nonetheless, despite recognizing its
restrictions and within the limits of available empirical
data, our research has shown the intertwinement between
the online and offline realms in today’s violent extremism.
Most importantly, it has laid the basis for new approaches
to update current intervention strategies. As regard to this
point, we would like to provide some recommendations for the
development of future de-radicalization programs that take
the onlife character of radicalization into account: (1) one-
sided measures that exclude either the offline or the online
side of radicalization should be avoided – the development of
grids to evaluate whether both realms have been considered
may be a helpful technique; (2) we highly encourage violent
extremism scholars to incorporate and closely monitor the
findings and methods employed in related research branches
around the relationship between digital interactions and offline
behavior and vice versa; as a matter of fact, the tight
effects of internet participation on physical activities among
mainstream population is well-established among internet
study experts; adapted to violent extremism such effects
could provide new insights to be included in counter-
radicalization efforts; (3) to better grasp the ways in which
online and offline components intertwine in the process of
radicalization, governments and organizations should partner
up with private social media companies and demand for
explanatory tools that account for the local layout of a user’s
newsfeed. In short, platforms should provide clear reasons
as to why their algorithms are presenting users with those
specific contents and friends’ choices (Reed et al., 2019);
(4) participants involved in de-radicalization programs and
their friends could take part in experiments of content
selection on social media. Coupled with follow-up self-reports,
these experiments could shed new light on the interrelation
between individuals and algorithms in the radicalization process.
However, we recognize that a clear picture of dynamics that
are involved in onlife locations is a difficult task, particularly
in the case of an “underground process” like radicalization.
Onlife environments change by the hour: algorithmic data-
gathering activity constantly updates an ever-increasing user’s
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datafied image. In other words, what regulates my onlife echo-
system today may be different from what regulates my onlife
system tomorrow.
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